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HOUSE OF JUDAH: THE PROBLEM OF 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN 
COMMUNES AND CULTS 
On July 3, 1983 a woman beat to death her twelve-year-old 
son in their home at the House of Judah religious camp in Alle-
gan, Michigan.1 Following examination of the body,2 police offi-
cials took the boy's five siblings into temporary custody in accor-
dance with the emergency removal provisions of Michigan law. 3 
At the preliminary hearing following emergency removal, the 
probate judge ruled not only that cause existed to justify contin-
ued temporary custody, but also that cause existed to investigate 
the welfare of all the children in the camp.• At the hearing, the 
statements and behavior of the camp's leader, Prophet Lewis, 
led the probate court to conclude that he was the "guardian" of 
all of the children in the camp.11 Concerned that Prophet Lewis's 
professed belief in harsh physical punishment, together with his 
apparent influence over the parents' judgment and behavior, 
posed a threat to the safety of all the children, the court ap-
pointed a committee of physicians and social workers to visit the 
camp and examine the children residing there. Although the 
committee found evidence of physical abuse of only eleven of 
1. House of Judah is a 22-acre religious camp in Lacota, a small village in southwest-
ern Michigan. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 28, 1983, at A3. The group has about one hun-
dred members who call themselves the black Hebrew Israelite Jews. Detroit Free Press, 
July 9, 1983, at AL The organization was founded in Chicago in 1966 by Prophet Wil-
liam Lewis, formerly an appliance repairman and barber. The group moved to its camp 
in Michigan in 1975. The camp consists of trailers and mobile homes, and each family 
lives and eats in its own trailer. Id. at A9. Most of the adults in the camp are women, 
Detroit Free Press, Aug. 28, 1983, at A12, and are unemployed, receiving welfare and Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children. Detroit Free Press, July 10, 1983, at All. 
2. The boy's body was taken to Douglas Hospital at about 6:00 a.m., July 4, 1983. 
The Allegan County medical examiner's report said that the boy died between midnight 
and 2:00 a.m. Detroit Free Press, July 10, 1983, at Al. 
3. M1cH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.15 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. Juv. CT. R. 2.1. See 
infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
4. In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2206-83 to 2210-83, at 50-51 (Pre-
liminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 6, 1983) (portions of 
this hearing on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
5. It is not clear what the court meant by naming Prophet Lewis "guardian" of the 
children. See infra text accompanying notes 109-11. 
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the sixty-six children,6 the court took temporary custody of all 
sixty-six children.7 
The court ordered placement of these children in foster homes 
in Allegan and surrounding counties, and social workers and 
psychologists evaluated them. The children remained in foster 
homes until the state reached an agreement with the parents by 
which all of the parents agreed to certain stipulations. In ex-
change for this agreement the state returned nearly all of the 
children. 
In handling this case, the court and state agencies made cer-
tain modifications to their "ordinary" procedures. This Note ar-
gues that although some modifications were appropriate, state 
intervention and removal of children, even from a commune or 
cult, should be handled through examination of each individual 
parent/child relationship. Part I examines the statutory and case 
law framework for state intervention and removal of children 
from the custody of abusive parents in Michigan, and discusses 
the policies supporting these laws. Part II examines the circum-
stances present in the House of Judah and notes the state's de-
partures from the statutes and rules. Part III analyzes and eval-
uates the usefulness and wisdom of these departures. Finally, 
Part IV briefly proposes alternative ways of handling child abuse 
and neglect cases in the context of communes and cults. 
I. MICHIGAN LAW: PROCEDURES FOR TEMPORARY COURT 
JURISDICTION OVER CHILDREN SUSPECTED OF BEING ABUSED OR 
NEGLECTED 
In Michigan, the Juvenile Code8 prescribes general rights and 
responsibilities of individuals and the state with regard to chil-
dren suspected of being abused or neglected. The Michigan Ju-
venile Court Rules supplement these provisions, setting forth 
more specific standards for state intervention and child removal. 
6. Detroit Free Press, July 8, 1983, at A3. 
7. The police took immediate emergency custody of the eleven physically abused 
children and then the state took custody of all the remaining children the next day at 
the adjourned preliminary hearing. See In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 
2211-83 to 2271-83, at 87 (Adjourned Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., 
Mich., filed July 12, 1983) (portions of this hearing on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
8. The Juvenile· Code is codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 712A.1-.28 (1979); recent 
amendments can be found in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712A.l-.28 (West Supp. 1985). 
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A. Procedures Required by Law 
When circumstances in a child's home are so unsafe9 that they 
require his immediate removal, 10 Michigan law empowers police 
officers to take temporary custody of the child.11 In all cases in 
which the state has taken temporary custody of a child, a pre-
liminary hearing before a probate court must be held within 
forty-eight hours of the child's removal from the home.12 The 
preliminary hearing is one of the procedural safeguards designed 
to protect the rights of the parents and child from unwarranted 
state intervention. 13 At this hearing, " [ m] ost, if not all, county 
juvenile courts require a showing of 'probable cause' or 'reason-
able cause' to believe the facts alleged [in the petition] 14 are true 
9. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 712A.2(b)(2)(West Supp. 1985) provides the state with 
"[j]urisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within 
the county . . . whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, 
criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian or other custodian, is an unfit 
place for such child to live in." See In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 
37 (1977)(finding that continued physical and sexual abuse of a child supported order 
taking temporary custody of the child's sibling). Compare this rather high level of mis-
treatment necessary to justify removal, with the lower levels of mistreatment that justify 
a finding of "unfitness" at a later stage in the proceedings. See, e.g., In re Taurus F., 415 
Mich. 512, 330 N.W.2d 33 (1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. Finney v. Michigan Dep't 
of Social Services, 464 U.S. 923 (1983) (holding that imprisonment of mother, without 
adequate alternative arrangements for custody, justified a finding of unfitness); _In re 
Adrianson, 105 Mich. App. 300, 306 N.W.2d 487 (1981)(holding that insufficient food in 
house and lack of medical care justified a finding of unfitness); In re Kurzawa, 95 Mich. 
App. 346, 290 N.W.2d 431, 435 (1980) ("Jurisdiction under the statute must be based on 
evidence of parental neglect, not on delinquency."). 
10. Alternatives to forced removal, such as voluntary placement of a child with a 
relative, are possible and preferable when safety can be ensured. See D. DUQUETTE, 
MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW 83 (1984)("Deskbook" prepared for Department of Social 
Services's use). This Note, however, focuses only on forced removal because that was the 
method the state used in House of Judah. 
11. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 712A.14 (1979), MICH. Juv. CT. R. 2.1. Following emergency 
removal the officer must obtain a court order authorizing continued detention, or must 
return the child to the custody of his parents. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 3.1. Although the statute 
limits the exercise of this power to police officers, it may effectively authorize emergency 
removal by protective services workers, who need only telephone for police assistance. 
The state may also take emergency custody of children through issuance of a Placement 
Order by a judge. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.15 (West Supp. 1985), MICH. Juv. CT. 
R. 2.1. A physician at a hospital may detain a child until an order for removal or release 
is issued. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.626 (West Supp. 1985). 
12. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(a). 
13. "Michigan law recognizes that parental rights are of constitutional magnitude 
and are protected by the due process clauses of the Michigan and United States Consti-
tutions." In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 224 n.2, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 n.2 (1977). 
Although some actions the state took in House of Judah may be subject to constitutional 
challenge, this Note's focus is on the state's use of its statutory and common law proce-
dures for child removal. 
14. Michigan law requires that a petition for court jurisdiction be filed "set[ting] 
1092 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
and that the facts, if proven, constitute neglect under [Michigan 
Compiled Laws] 712A.2(b)."1 ~ Unless the court finds grounds for 
continued custody under Michigan Juvenile Court Rules 4.2 and 
3.1, the state must return the child to his parent or guardian.16 
If the court authorizes a petition for jurisdiction at the prelim-
inary hearing, it will usually issue a preliminary order specifying 
a plan for temporary placement.17 The court may place the child 
in or out of the parents' custody,18 and it may place restrictions 
forth any charges against a child, parent, or custodian with sufficient clarity and specific-
ity to reasonably apprise them of the matters concerning which court action is sought." 
MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.1. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 712A.11 (1979) ("[The petition] shall 
set forth plainly the facts which bring said child within the provisions of this chapter 
.... "). These provisions stipulate standards and procedures for drafting and filing a 
petition. See, e.g., In re Kurzawa, 95 Mich. App. 346, 290 N.W.2d 431 (1980)(holding 
that the probate court erred in assuming jurisdiction in proceedings to terminate paren-
tal rights; proceedings void ab initio because petitions failed to allege the type of neglect 
contemplated by the statute). 
Professor Duquette notes that the petition has two main functions: 
First, it is a court document which should state the alleged basis of the court's 
jurisdiction over a particular child. The petition names the respondents (gener-
ally the parents) and sets the scope of the judicial inquiry. The court may not 
inquire into matters not alleged in the petition . . .. Second, the petition is a 
communication to the respondent parents. It gives them notice of accusations 
against them so that they might evaluate their situation and prepare a response. 
The description of the parent's acts of commission or omission should be put in 
terms specific enough to allow a defense to be prepared. 
D. DUQUETTE, supra note 10, at 94. 
15. D. DUQUETTE, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
16. Id. See generally MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.1 (1979), the Preamble to the Juve-
nile Code, which states that "[t]his chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that 
each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive ... care, guidance, 
and control, preferably in his own home." (emphasis added). Professor Duquette sug-
gests that this creates a presumption in favor of the child remaining in his own home. 
Indeed, he notes that "[t]he judge or referee is expected to inquire whether reasonable 
efforts have been made by the petitioner (usually the Department of Social Services) to 
prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home." D. DUQUETTE, supra note 10, 
at 114-15. But even with this presumption "the decision concerning placement pending 
trial will be based on an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the family, the 
social and psychological needs of the child and the risk of further harm to the child." Id. 
at 115. 
17. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(7) describes the options available to a court at the con-
clusion of the preliminary hearing: 
At the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing the judge or referee shall decide 
whether to (a) authorize the petition to be filed; and if authorized, (b) release 
the child in the custody of a parent, guardian or custodian or, on a showing of 
probable cause that the defendant committed the offense or a waiver of the 
showing, order detention or placement of the child pending hearing. The defen-
dant may cross-examine the witnesses against him and may introduce evidence 
on his own behalf. If a child is not released, the child must be placed pending 
trial in the least restrictive placement that will meet the child's needs and the 
needs of the public. 
18. MICH. COMP_- LAWS § 712A.14 (1979) gives the court various options for temporary 
placement: 
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on the nature and content of contact any involved adult may 
have with the child.19 The statute also requires that the court 
give notice .to the parties affected by each of the court 
proceedings. 20 
Following the preliminary hearing, the next formal stage in 
the proceedings is the adjudicative phase at which the court "de-
termines whether the child comes within the probate court's ju-
risdiction . . . as alleged in the petition. "21 In particular, the 
court will determine whether the child is neglected within the 
meaning of the statute. If so, the court will order the disposition 
or placement that comports with the child's best interests.22 
B. Interests Protected by the Law 
1. The child's interests- Most, if not all, commentators 
would agree that in child abuse cases the child's interests should 
In the event the complaint is authorized the order shall also direct the place-
ment of the child, pending investigation and hearing, which placement may be in 
the home of the parents, guardian, or custodian, in the boarding care of a li-
censed child care agency, or in a suitable place of detention designated by the 
court. 
19. According to Professor Duquette, the court may issue orders affecting adult be-
havior toward the child: 
By reading various sections of the Juvenile Code and the Juvenile Court Rules 
together the court seems to have the authority not only to place the child in 
foster care or with relatives but also to place a child in the custody of his parent 
or parents under certain terms and conditions . . . . Such authority may enable 
the court to protect the child from harm in appropriate cases without removing 
the child from his familiar surroundings .... [These orders) may range from 
requiring that the parents allow regular, even daily, visits from the caseworker 
. . . to refraining from alcohol. 
D. DuQUE'ITE, supra note 10, at 122-23. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.1 (1979) (stating 
that the Juvenile Code is to be liberally construed with a preference for care of the child 
"in his own home"); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.14 (1979) (declaring that the court shall 
designate a "suitable place of detention"); MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(7) (stating that if a 
child is not released, the child must be placed, pending trial, in the least restrictive envi-
ronment that will meet the child's needs and the needs of the public). 
20. The state must attempt to notify the parent(s) or guardian(s) immediately after a 
child is taken into custody. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.14 (1979); MICH. Juv. CT. R. 2.3. It 
must also provide the court with a record of who was notified, or the reason for failure to 
notify. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 2.3. The court's first task at the preliminary hearing is to deter-
mine whether notification procedures were properly executed with regard to emergency 
custody. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(l). Then the court must explain the nature of the pro-
ceedings, MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(3), and advise the parents of their right to an attorney. 
MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(4). 
21. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 8.l(a). 
22. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 8.l(b). 
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be given first priority.23 Michigan law protects both the child's 
immediate physical safety and his emotional well-being. 
a. The child's physical safety24- The provisions in Michi-
gan's Juvenile Code that allow for immediate removal of a child 
in emergency situations manifest the state's commitment to pro-
tecting the child's "health, morals, or welfare."25 Clearly, these 
provisions speak to the need to protect the child's physical 
safety from an abusive or neglectful parent. Indeed, some com-
mentators would limit the law's intervention primarily to cases 
in which the child's physical safety appears at risk.26 Further-
more, Michigan case law unambiguously supports the power of 
the state to intervene in family relationships when necessary to 
protect a child from physical harm. 27 
The applicable law reflects a policy that, at the emergency 
stage, finds the child's interest in safety superior to all other in-
terests. The statute allows for removal of children even if danger 
is only a possibility. It is not until the preliminary hearing that 
the earlier removal must be justified before a court. 28 Thus, at 
this initial stage the law authorizes error on the side of 
overprotection. 
b. Child's emotional well-being29- Michigan's Juvenile 
Code also evidences concern for protecting the child's emotional 
23. See IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, ABusE AND 
NEGLECT 1.5 (1981)(hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]: "[l]n cases where a child's needs, as 
defined in these standards conflict with his/her parents' interests, the child's needs 
should have priority." Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD 105 (1973)[hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN], which qualifies this prin-
ciple: "[T]he child's interests should be the paramount consideration once, but not 
before, a child's placement becomes the subject of official controversy." 
24. Under the label "physical safety" this Note includes protection from any immedi-
ate danger. It is possible to imagine a case requiring emergency removal to protect a 
child from immediate emotional harm. Such harm might result if, for example, a child 
were forced to witness one parent brutally beat or kill the other. Cf. In re Arntz, 125 
Mich. App. 634, 637-38, 336 N.W.2d 848, 850 (1983) (per curiam) (stating that probate 
court properly assumed jurisdiction where petition included allegation that children were 
deprived of "emotional well-being"), reu'd on other grounds, 418 Mich. 941, 344 N.W.2d 
1 (1984). More typically, emergency removal is required only to protect physical safety. 
25. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.14 (1979), MICH. Juv. CT. R. 2.2(d). See supra notes 9-
11 and accompanying text. 
26. See STANDARDS, supra note 23, at 93-94; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1007-20 
(1975). 
27. See, e.g., In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977)(holding 
that continued physical and sexual abuse of a child supported order taking temporary 
custody of his sibling). 
28. See MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(a), and supra text accompanying note 15. 
29. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 31-37. "Continuity of relationships, surround-
ings, and environmental influence are essential for a child's normal development." Id. at 
31-32. 
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well-being.30 Protection of the child's emotional well-being, how-
ever, is difficult to provide for several reasons. First, psycholo-
gists themselves disagree about how best to protect the emo-
tional well-being of a child. 31 Regardless of this ambiguity, 
protection of physical safety may conflict with the protection of 
emotional stability. Psychologists say that children form impor-
tant emotional bonds even with abusive or neglectful parents. 32 
Because it disrupts whatever stable home-life the child may 
know, removal of a child from his family may cause substantial 
emotional and psychological damage. 33 Perhaps partly for this 
reason, Michigan's Juvenile Code states a preference for placing 
the child in his own home, although the child still may be under 
the court's jurisdiction. 34 
The Michigan Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the 
frequent conflict between the child's interests in emotional well-
being and physical safety.311 Similarly, the Michigan Juvenile 
Code attempts to balance these interests. First, the law grants 
substantial authority to the state to remove possibly endangered 
30. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 712A.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985); MICH. Juv. CT. R. 
2.l(a). See also In re Arntz, 125 Mich. App. 634, 637-38, 336 N.W.2d 848, 850 (1983) 
(ruling that the probate court properly assumed jurisdiction over minor children where 
the petition filed included allegations that the children were deprived of "emotional well-
being"), rev'd on other grounds, 418 Mich. 941, 344 N.W.2d 1 (1984). 
31. Emphasizing the vital importance of continuity and stability in a child's psycho-
logical development, some commentators insist that the child's emotional well-being is 
best protected by minimal state interference with the parent-child relationship. See J. 
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 8-10 (1979). 
Others, however, find this simple formula unsatisfying, because it fails to consider the 
benefits of intervention. See Wald, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REV. 645, 664-65 (1980)(re-
viewing J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1979)). 
32. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 19; Wald, supra note 26, at 994. 
33. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 23, at 19-20; Wald, supra note 26, at 994. 
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. See Reist v. Bay County, 396 Mich. 326, 345-46, 241 N.W.2d 55, 64 
(1976)("The best interests of the child will often be served by preservation of the parent-
child bond; the child as well as the parent has an interest in preservation of their 
relationship."). 
35. The elements of the conflict are clearly presented in Reist v. Bay County, 396 
Mich. 326, 241 N.W.2d 55 (1976). The majority emphasized the child's interest in emo-
tional well-being and found this interest to be consistent with the parent's interest in 
care and custody. Id. at 345, 241 N.W.2d at 64. Justice Coleman, in a separate opinion, 
disagreed: 
In termination proceedings, the focus is on protecting the child. The question is 
whether the juvenile court must intercede on behalf of the child. Upon a disposi-
tion which terminates parental rights, the court necessarily finds that it is con-
trary to the best interest of the child to remain with that parent. It has been 
determined as a matter of fact and of law that the interests of the parent and of 
the child are inconsistent. 
Id. at 356, 241 N.W.2d at 68 (Coleman, J., dissenting in part). 
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children in the initial emergency stages of the proceedings.36 Al-
though the authority granted to the police and medical person-
nel37 may result in erroneous removal of some children, such re-
moval from imminent physical danger is carefully limited in 
scope and duration.38 Later, after emergency removal has elimi-
nated the immediate physical danger,39 the law's more rigorous 
standards require a showing of reasonable cause to believe that 
the parent committed legal neglect before continued removal 
may be authorized.40 In this way the negative emotional effects 
of prolonged separation are avoided, unless there is a showing of 
the likelihood of continued physical or emotional danger. 
2. Parental interests- In Anglo-American society, the law 
traditionally grants parents a great amount of freedom in raising 
their children. 41 The Supreme Court repeatedly has indicated 
that parents' interests in care and custody of their children are 
tantamount to "fundamental liberties" protected by the due 
process clause of the Constitution.42 
Michigan statutory law likewise protects several parental in-
terests. Most obvious among these provisions is the Juvenile 
36. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. See also MICH. Juv. CT. R. 
2.2(d)(allowing temporary custody without a court order when a child's surroundings en-
danger his health, morals, or welfare). 
37. See supra note 11. 
38. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(a) (requiring that a preliminary hearing before a probate 
court be held within 48 hours of a child's removal from his home). 
39. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
40. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2. 
41. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1971)(upholding the right of 
Amish, on religious and cultural grounds, to withdraw their children from public school 
prior to the minimum dropout age); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) 
(stressing parents' right to the custody, care, and nurture of their children); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (upholding right of parents to direct the 
upbringing and education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) 
(upholding the right of parents to control of their children and recognizing their corre-
sponding duty to provide suitable education). See also J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE 
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1947): 
God hath made it their [the parents'] business to employ this care on their off-
spring, and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern 
to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to the children's 
good, as long as they should need to be under it. 
Id. at 32. 
42. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)(stating that the right to care and cus-
tody of one's child is a right "far more precious ... than property rights"); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)(declaring that "the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)(declaring that the right to care and custody of one's child is 
"one of the basic civil rights of man"). 
SUMMER 1985] Child Abuse in Communes 1097 
Code's presumption in favor of home placement.'3 Even after 
parental misconduct has allowed state intervention in the family 
sphere, many provisions of the Code are designed to protect par-
ents' due process rights." 
3. When the interests conflict: the statutory policy- As the 
ultimate protector of children from abuse and neglect, the state 
has an obligation to secure the health and safety of children. 411 
But as the Supreme Court has noted, the state has no interest in 
separating a child from a fit parent,'6 and such a parent has a 
strong interest in a fair adjudication to protect his own interest 
in the care and custody of his child. ' 7 To ensure that the state 
exercises its parens patriae power'8 only in cases of necessity, 
the Michigan legislature has enacted the Juvenile Code.'9 
Through enactment of procedural safeguards, the legislature has 
attempted to protect both the child's and the parents' interests. 
The Code gives protective services workers and police officers 
the authority to remove a child on the mere appearance of dan-
ger,60 while limiting this authority by requiring the prosecutor to 
prove such danger to a judge shortly after the removal. 61 
At the emergency stage, the child's interest in physical 
43. MICH. CoMP. LAWS§ 712A.l (1979). See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
44. Michigan law recognizes that parental rights are of constitutional magnitude and 
are protected by the due process clauses of the Michigan and ·united States Constitu-
tions. In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 224 n.2, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 n.2 (1977). To 
ensure procedural due process, the Michigan legislature has enacted provisions in the 
Juvenile Code and Juvenile Court Rules. See, e.g., Mice. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.861, 
712A.21 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. Juv. CT. R 2.3, 4, 7, 8, 9. ' 
45. In performing this obligation, the state relies on its parens patriae power. 
"Parens patriae," literally "parent of country," .... 
Parens patriae originates from the English common law where the King had a 
royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as 
infants, idiots and lunatics. In the United States, the parens patriae function 
belongs with the states. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
46. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1971). "We do not question the asser-
tion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children .... [But] we observe 
that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children 
from the custody of fit parents." 
47. "We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a 
hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody." Id. at 658. 
48. See supra note 45. 
49. Every state has enacted laws protecting abused and neglected children. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-1 to 26-14-13 (1975 & Supp. 1984); ARiz. REv. STAT. Ann. §§ 8-531 to 
8-544 (1956 & West Supp. 1974-84); IND. CODE Ann. §§ 31-6-11-1 to 31-6-11-22 (West 
1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 681-689 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REv. CODE§§ 
26.44.010-.44.900 (1983). 
50. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; MlcH. Juv. CT. R 2.2(d). 
51. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
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safety112 is clearly paramount, and parents' interests get little if 
any consideration. 63 Michigan law allows police and medical pro-
fessionals to detain or take temporary custody of a child whom 
they suspect is, or has been, abused or neglected. 64 This broad 
grant of authority allows for substantial error on the side of 
overprotection. Concern for the child's physical safety66 and rec-
ognition of the state's role as the ultimate protector of children66 
together justify this policy. 
At the preliminary hearing stage the child's interest in physi-
cal safety remains paramount, but the law limits the state's op-
tions for protecting this interest. Because it cannot be that after 
forty-eight hours the state ceases to be concerned with the 
child's physical safety,67 the more limited range of options avail-
able to the court and to the state's agents-police, protective 
services workers, courts, prosecutors-must reflect a desire to 
protect the child's interest in maintaining a continuous, emo-
tional relationship with his parents68 and the parents' interest in 
custody and care of their child.69 The Juvenile Code delegates 
the state's ultimate decision-making power to a neutral fact 
finder by requiring an adversary preliminary hearing to be held 
within forty-eight hours of emergency removal.60 At this hearing 
the state's agents must file a petition61 and convince the probate 
court that there is "reasonable cause to believe that the facts 
alleged [in the petition] are true, and that the facts, if proven, 
constitute neglect."62 Furthermore, unlike the ex parte proceed-
ing at which the court may issue an order of emergency cus-
tody, 63 at the preliminary hearing the parents' right to appear 
with counsel6" limits the prosecutor's ability to effect or continue 
removal of a child. Even if the court should find neglect, it re-
52. See supra note 24. 
53. Parents' interests appear to be protected, for example, by protective services 
workers' inability to legally remove a child from his parents. See D. DuQUETI'E, supra 
note 10, at 83. This serves as little protection, however, because Michigan law empowers 
police to take immediate custody of endangered children. See supra note 11. 
54. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
55. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
57. Within 48 hours of removal the state must hold a preliminary hearing. MlcH. Juv. 
CT. R. 4.2. 
58. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. The emotional well-being of the 
child is protected in addition to the parents' interests. See supra note 35. 
59. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
60. M1cH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(a). 
61. M1cH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.11 (1979); M1cH. Juv. CT. R. 4.1. 
62. D. DUQUETI'E, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
63. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 3.3(b)(l); see D. DuQUE'M'E, supra note 10, at 86. 
64. See M1cH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(4). 
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mains bound by the statutory preference for home placement.611 
At the adjudicative phase66 the Juvenile Code increases the 
protection of the parents' and child's interests in continuous 
care and custody by requiring a higher standard of proof than at 
earlier phases. This higher standard mandates that the prosecu-
tor show by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations 
in the petition are true. 67 The higher standard of proof restricts 
the options available to the state's agents by narrowing the 
range of facts regarding which the prosecutor can successfully 
convince a judge of the necessity for foster care. Thus, weak evi-
dence encourages the state's agents to settle with the parents for 
less control of a child than the state believes necessary to pro-
tect the child fully. 
The legislative goal of protecting both the parents' and child's 
interests in continuous care and custody, and the state's interest 
in protecting the child's physical safety, are manifest in the in-
ternal logic of the Juvenile Code. The Code gives the state's 
agents broad authority to protect even possibly endangered chil-
dren from physical harm at the emergency stage, but then grad-
ually adds procedural safeguards to protect other interests in 
later stages by requiring attention to the individual parent-child 
relationship. 
II. HOUSE OF JUDAH 
Comparison of the response of the court and the state's agents 
with Michigan law reveals that the agents departed from some 
statutory provisions while securing custody of the children at 
the House of Judah camp. Although departures occurred at sev-
eral different stages of the removal process, they were closely 
linked by an underlying failure to treat each child individually. 
A. How The Court and State's Agents Responded 
The state's involvement with the House of Judah began when 
members of the camp brought the body of a twelve-year-old boy 
to the hospital. Physicians suspected physical abuse as the cause 
65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
66. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 8.l(a) ("The adjudicative phase determines whether the child 
comes within the court's jurisdiction .... "). 
67. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 8.3(a). 
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of death and contacted the police.68 The police visited the camp 
to question the boy's mother, and removed her other children 
from the household.69 In accordance with Michigan law, a pre-
liminary hearing was scheduled and held two days later.70 
From responses to a series of questions the court posed at the 
preliminary hearing, and from information Prophet Lewis volun-
teered, the court concluded that the emergency removal of the· 
dead boy's siblings was reasonable.71 It also concluded that 
Prophet Lewis's influence over the children and parents in the 
camp made him the "guardian" of all the children.72 The court 
. appeared to rest its conclusion of guardianship on the theory 
that the only meaningful characterization of the relationship be-
tween the various members of the cult was that of a family. 73 As 
the apparent head of this large family, Prophet Lewis seemed to 
have a strong influence over the disciplinary practices in the 
camp. Because of the strict disciplinary beliefs Lewis espoused,74 
the court reasoned that the same practices that appeared to 
have led to the death of one child might endanger the other chil-
dren in the camp. Accordingly, the court ordered investigation of 
68. Michigan law requires certain professionals, including physicians, to report sus-
pected child abuse or neglect. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 1985). 
69. See Detroit Free Press, July 8, 1983, at A3. 
70. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(a). 
71. See In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2206-83 to 2210-83, at 46-47 
(Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 6, 1983). Presuma-
bly, removal of the abused child's siblings was found to be consistent with Michigan law. 
See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
72. See In re Children of the House of Judah,-File Nos. 2206-83 to 2210-83, at 48-49 
(Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 6, 1983). 
73. See id. See also In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2211-83 to 2271-
83, at 183 (Adjourned Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed 
July 12, 1983). The court said: 
That as a result, the Court is going to continue [to hold] all of the children ... 
including [the dead child's siblings even though they] are not technically [before 
the court] today. [T]he same reasoning applies [to all of the children] because 
the same threat is there. [T]here is but ... one big . . . umbrella family here 
[consisting] of all those who look to [the Prophet Lewis as their leader on earth]. 
[T]here's been no indication that there will be any change in the area [with 
which] the Court is concerned .... 
Id. at 183. 
74. Detroit Free Press, July 10, 1983, at All: 
Punishment at the camp was rigorous and systematic, Lewis said. 
Lewis said he divides the group into three age groups: those younger than 
seven years old, those seven to 17 years old, and adults. Punishment depends on 
the age of the member and the transgression, Lewis said. 
Younger members are beaten with switches by their mothers, often as Lewis 
stands by and assures it is done right, he said. 
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the welfare of all the children. 7 & 
At the preliminary hearing the probate court appointed an in-
vestigatory committee consisting of a physician, social workers, 
and the court administrator to visit the camp the next day and 
examine all the children for evidence of abuse and/or neglect.78 
Physical examinations of the children revealed evidence of abuse 
in eleven of the sixty-six cases.77 When questioned by committee 
members as to the cause of the children's injuries, the parents 
candidly admitted to having administered harsh physical disci-
pline, in accordance with the teachings and instructions of 
Prophet Lewis.78 After this three-hour investigation the police 
took custody of the eleven abused children.79 The next day, at 
the adjourned preliminary hearing, the court ordered the re-
moval of all of the children still living in the camp.80 
Upon removal from the camp, the state's agents placed the 
children in foster homes in Allegan and surrounding counties. 
Department of Social Services (the Department) workers in 
these counties then arranged for physical, psychological, and 
emotional studies of the children. 81 The studies concluded, 
among other things, that the children were for the most part 
emotionally and psychologically well-adjusted.82 Moreover, the 
studies revealed that the children's bonds with their parents 
were very strong. 83 With one or two exceptions, the committee 
also concluded that the parents were emotionally and psycholog-
75. In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2206-83 to 2210-83, at 51 (Pre-
liminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 6, 1983). 
76. See id. at 51-52. 
77. Detroit Free Press, August 28, 1983, at A3. 
78. See In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2211-83 to 2271-83 (Ad-
journed Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 12, 1983). 
The court stated: 
There's no remorse for [past punishment and the boy's death], at least none is 
proclaimed . . . . [I]f presented with the same situation again, the same disci-
pline _could be expected .... [T]he head of the House of Judah [has said] that 
he would do it [again] and [appparently] he's not going to ... change ... [his] 
beliefs I or his understanding of) the bible. 
Id. at 182. 
79. Detroit Free Press, July 8, 1983, at A3. 
80. In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2211-83 to 2271-83, at 182 (Ad-
journed Preliminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 12, 1983). 
81. Id. at 183-85. 
82. Interview with John Atkins, Allegan County Juv. Ct. Adm'r, in Allegan, Michigan 
(May 8, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Atkins interview]. In addition to his job as court 
administrator for the case, John Atkins also served as head of the committee appointed 
by the judge to investigate and evaluate the conditions at the camp. He worked closely 
with the parties to the case as well as the investigative personnel. 
83. Id. 
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ically well-adjusted. 84 
Despite the statutory requirement that adjudicatory hearings 
take place within forty-two days of preliminary hearings,811 ap-
peal of certain interlocutory orders delayed the adjudicatory 
hearing for more than two months.86 During this period the in-
vestigatory committee concluded that it had a reasonable chance 
of demonstrating parental neglect only in the cases of the eleven 
children who had shown signs of physical abuse.87 With this in 
mind, the state's agents proposed to the parents the return of 
the children and the avoidance of an adjudicatory hearing alto-
gether, if the parents agreed to a Dispositional Plan drawn up 
by the state's agents.88 The Dispositional Plan required the par-
ents to agree to end all excessive physical punishment,89 make 
certain repairs and improvements to the camp facilities,90 and 
attend a six-week parenting course conducted by the Depart-
ment. 91 In addition, the Plan allowed certain court officials and 
social workers to visit, observe, and inspect the camp at any 
time.92 In exchange, the state's agents agreed to return the chil-
dren. 93 The parents and their attorney agreed to this arrange-
ment and the court eventually approved it.94 
B. Departures from the Statutory Scheme: Lack of 
Individualized Treatment 
The probate court's actions in House of Judah reveal at least 
four departures from the statutory rules and procedures nor-
mally followed in "ordinary" child abuse and neglect cases. Each 
of these departures involved a lack of individualized treatment 
84. Id. 
85. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 8.1. 
86. After the preliminary hearings, a newspaper organization filed a motion to keep 
the proceedings open to the media. This issue was argued numerous times in the circuit 
court and thus delayed the adjudicatory phase. In re Booth Newspapers, Inc., File No. 
83-5464 AS (Allegan County Cir. Ct., Mich., filed Aug. 18, 1983). 
87. Atkins interview, supra note 82. According to Atkins, the committee formed to 
oversee the investigation of the children and parents came to a consensus on this point. 
88. Id. Each family was presented with a copy of the Plan. 
89. See Dispositional Plan, points 2 and 3a (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
90. Id. at point 3b. 
91. Id. at point 4e. 
92. Id. at point 4b. 
93. Atkins interview, supra note 82. 
94. Id. 
Approximately eleven of the children are still in foster care. Many of these have not 
been returned because their parents are either in prison or have just been released and 
are not yet able to support their children. Id. 
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of the parents and children. 
I. Emergency removal and filing of petitions- Before a 
court may authorize a petition for temporary removal, Michigan 
law requires that the prosecutor show that "reasonable cause" 
exists to believe that the allegations in the petition are true, and 
that if true constitute legal neglect.911 In concluding that reason-
able cause exists as to a particular child, courts have permitted 
the prosecutor to present evidence of mistreatment of that 
child's siblings.98 To date, however, no Michigan court has found 
reasonable cause to believe a child in one household has been 
neglected on the basis of harm to a child in another household. 
In House of Judah, the court appears to have stretched the 
reasonable cause requirement outside the walls of the abusing 
household to include all of the children in the camp. The mate-
rial elements of the petitions provide evidence of this stretching 
of the reasonable cause requirement. The patitions for tempo-
rary removal alleged that each child was situated similarly to the 
child who was beaten to death because the children all lived in 
the same religious camp, at which abuse was an accepted prac-
tice. 97 They also alleged that each parent may not have been suf-
ficiently protective of his children because the abused boy's 
mother failed to protect him. 98 Although formally addressed to 
each child and his parents, the petitions did not allege facts spe-
95. D. DuQUETI'E, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
96. In re Lafiure, 48 Mich. App. 377, 392, 210 N.W.2d 482,489 (1973)("How a parent 
treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children .... 
such evidence should be received.") Evidence of mistreatment of siblings can be 
presented even "where no prior determination of neglect has been made." In re Dittrick 
Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 222, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977). 
97. See In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2211-83 to 2271-83, 7 (Pre-
liminary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 8, 1983) (portions of 
this hearing on file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). Sections of the identical petitions read: 
1. That on July 4, 1983, [a boy] ... died as a result of a severe beating. 
2. That [the boy] was beaten while a member of the religious colony known as 
the House of Judah. 
3. That Dr. Kenneth Kratzner examined several of the children from the same 
household on July 4, 1983, and observed what appeared to be scars and other 
evidence of what was in his opinion physical abuse. 
4. That it is my understanding that physical punishment and abuse is an ac-
cepted practice at, "the," religious colony. 
5. That the Prophet Lewis, the leader of the colony, has openly admitted the 
use of a 'rod' upon members of the colony, including the juveniles, to 'chastise' 
them. 
6. That your petitioner is concerned for the physical safety of said child, espe-
cially in light of the fact that no parent or parental figure protected [the dead 
boy]. 
Id. at 7. 
98. See id. Count 6 makes this general allegation. 
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cific to the named parties, but made general allegations relying 
on the parties' membership in, and residence at, the House of 
Judah camp. 
It might be argued that lack of specificity made the petitions 
insufficient as a matter of law.99 But even if the petitions con-
tained sufficient legal specificity, and the allegations could have 
been proven, it is still not clear that the allegations would have 
constituted neglect. If proven, the material elements of the peti-
tions100 would merely have shown that the parties lived in a 
commune in which strict physical punishment was an accepted 
practice101 and in which one parent was not sufficiently protec-
tive of her child. 102 
Although the prosecutor could easily have remedied the defi-
ciencies in specificity of the allegations by amendment, 103 the 
petition envinces the prosecutor's and court's non-individualistic 
theory of the case. The literal identity of the sixty-six petitions 
indicates that state involvement began with no consideration of 
the potential differences in parental attitudes, behavior, and 
skills that might have characterized particular parent-child rela-
tionships. Allegation that harm to one child indicated potential 
harm to another non-family child extended the reach of the 
probable cause requirement beyond prior Michigan precedent.104 
In addition, this allegation foreshadowed an inattention to indi-
99. See supra note 14. According to Professor Duquette, the practice in at least the 
majority of counties in Michigan would be to reject the petitions filed in House of Judah 
because they fail to make specific allegations of abuse to specific children. Interview with 
Don Duquette, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan (April 21, 1985). 
See generally In re Certain Children, No. 22-6-840sj, slip op. (Dist. Ct. Vt. July 12, 
1984) (copy on file with U. MlcH. J.L. REF.). The State of Vermont took custody of 112 
children whose families allegedly belonged to the Northeast Kingdom Community 
Church in Island Pond, Vermont. The court rejected the state's petition for jurisdiction 
which alleged that "all children under the age of 18 residing in the community ... may 
be in need of care and supervision." Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted). The court held the 
petition to be "defective on its face," id. at 3, because it made "no attempt to allege facts 
constituting any of the children to be children in need of care or supervision. Although 
the accompanying affidavit [did] make reference to other specific children, presumably 
living in the same community, it is essentially a collection of generalized assumptions as 
to these children." Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
Thus, in a case factually similar to House of Judah but governed by another jurisdic-
tion, a court refused to accept generalized petitions. The court in In re Certain Children 
was concerned that the state's group approach might violate the parent's first and fifth 
amendment rights of freedom of association and religion. Id. at 7-8. 
100. See supra note 97. 
101. See supra note 97. Count 4 makes this allegation. 
102. See supra note 97. 9ount 6 makes this allegation. 
103. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.11 (1979). 
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
SUMMER 1985) Child Abuse in Communes 1105 
vidual family characteristics that pervaded the case1011 and could 
well have led to serious harm to some of the children of the 
camp. 106 Precisely because the Juvenile Code's highest priority 
demands protection of children from physical harm, 107 any pro-
cedure that increases the risk of harm to individual children de-
parts from the statutory policy. 108 Even apart from the problem 
presented by petitions making allegations that if proven would 
not have constituted neglect, the failure to require specificity 
sufficient to protect each child unacceptably violated the Juve-
nile Code. 
2. Treating the camp as one "family" and the Prophet 
Lewis as the "guardian" of all of the children- In permitting 
the prosecutor to make a reasonable cause showing on the basis 
of the death of a child from another family, the court also relied 
on its finding that Prophet Lewis was the guardian of the chil-
dren of the communal family. The court's acceptance of this 
non-individualistic approach is further evidence of its stretching 
the reasonable cause standard. The propriety of the removal of 
the sixty-six children therefore turns in large measure on the 
finding that Prophet Lewis was their guardian. 
In making this finding, the court departed from any existing 
statutory or precedential authority. The Juvenile Code fre-
quently uses "guardian" interchangeably with "parent" and 
"custodian,"109 and the same legal responsibilities, at least with 
respect to abusive or neglectful behavior, are imposed upon all 
three classes of adults. 110 Michigan law does not contemplate the 
105. The court treated the camp as one family, accepted petitions lacking informa-
tion specific to each child, and negotiated the return of the children as a group. See infra 
text accompanying notes 109-23. 
106. For example, treating the children as a group rather than as individuals could 
lead the state to return even endangered children as part of a "package" solution. See 
infra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
107. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra text acompanying note 45. 
109. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b)(West Supp. 1985)(giving the court 
jurisdiction where home or environment of "a parent, guardian or other custodian, is an 
unfit place for such child to live"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.14 (1979) (authorizing the 
release of a child "found violating any law or ordinance" to his "parents, guardian or 
custodian" unless the judge authorizes the filing of a complaint). 
110. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b)(l)(West Supp. 1985)(giving the 
court jurisdiction over a child when the parent, guardian, or custodian fails to provide 
the support, education, medical, and other care necessary for health and morals); 
§ 712A.18(3) (authorizing the court to include a provision in an order of disposition that 
requires the child, parent, guardian, or custodian to reimburse the state for the cost of 
services); M1cH. Juv. CT. R. 1.3 (stating that the court rules are designed to "safeguard 
procedural rights, and the proper interests of the child, the child's parents, guardians or 
custodians, and the public"); Rule 2.3 (requiring an officer taking a child into custody to 
notify the parent, guardian, or custodian); Rule 6.1 (requiring court to notify the child 
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use of the term "guardian" to describe some intermediate or an-
cillary position of responsibility and control over children who 
live with their legal parents. The court may appoint a guardian 
for a minor child when either the parents' rights have been ter-
minated, or the child's physical well-being necessitates appoint-
ment.111 The court made neither of these findings in House of 
Judah. The court did not terminate the parents' rights and 
Prophet Lewis was not appointed guardian to ensure the physi-
cal well-being of the children. Thus, by naming Prophet Lewis 
guardian of sixty-six children, all of whom lived with their legal 
parents, the court created an intermediate status. The court's 
action clearly departs from existing Michigan authority. 
3. Continued non-specific treatment: failure to amend peti-
tions- The court also departed from Michigan law by failing to 
require the prosecutor to amend the petitions and prevail at an 
adjourned preliminary hearing. 112 In all child abuse and neglect 
cases involving removal, the Department is obligated to do an 
investigation,113 file a petition,114 and produce evidence to sup-
port the petition at a preliminary hearing.m In House of Judah, 
the state's agents did not make an investigation sufficient to de-
termine whether individual children were in danger. Conse-
quently, the state's agents lacked the information necessary to 
file a petition specific to each child.116 The court held a prelimi-
nary hearing but deviated from the statute and accepted the 
faulty petitions. It did not, as it might have, schedule an ad-
and his parent, guardian, or custodian of their right to counsel, and stating that such 
counsel may be appointed by the court under Rule 6.3 (A)(2)(b)). 
111. The Child Protection Law, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 722.621-.636 (West Supp. 
1985), makes no provision for the appointment of guardians. That function is granted to 
the probate court under MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 700.424 (West Supp. 1985). The court 
may appoint a guardian for a minor child when either "(a) [t]he parental rights of both 
parents or of the surviving parent have been terminated or suspended by ... prior court 
order," or "(b) [t]he appointment is necessary for the immediate physical well-being of 
the minor." Id. 
It is also possible for the court to appoint a limited guardian under M1cH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 700.424a (West Supp. 1985). This, however, may be done only when the parents 
voluntarily consent to the suspension of their parental rights. The parents in House of 
Judah never gave this consent. 
112. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(6) allows for adjournment of the preliminary hearing for 
up to 10 days in cases in which an order for detention has been granted to take testi-
mony and for other good cause. 
113. Although this investigation is not statutorily required for the Department to 
take custody, as a practical matter an investigation is necessary in order to file an ade-
quate petition and convince a judge of the need for taking temporary jurisdiction and 
custody of a child. 
114. See supra note 14. 
115. See D. DUQUETTE, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
116. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text. 
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journed hearing, 117 at which the Department would have been 
required to submit individualized petitions based on sufficient 
investigation. Because these actions failed to provide the indi-
vidualized information and protection necessary to effectuate 
the statutory scheme, the court failed to compel the state's 
agents to meet the requirements of Michigan's law. 
4. Negotiating return of the children as a group- When ap-
proving the return of children to their parents, the Juvenile 
Code requires the court to examine individual families. The stat-
ute addresses individual children and their parents, not groups 
of children and groups of parents. 118 The legislature's concern 
for individualized treatment rests on two grounds. First, it rec-
ognizes the importance to the child of a continuous relationship 
with his parents. The state ought not disrupt this relationship 
without good reason. Even more important, failure to treat chil-
dren individually may harm a child whose needs differ from 
those of the group.119 
In addition, due process requirements protect the parents' 
rights to care and custody of their children. 120 The state has an 
interest in protecting children from unfit parents, but has no in-
terest in separating children from fit parents.121 The prosecutor 
cannot make the showing of a parent's unfitness necessary to 
justify separation from his child without examination of the in-
dividual parent.122 Both Michigan law and the principle of due 
process thus protect the individual parent-child relationship. By 
negotiating and executing the return of the children to their par-
ents as a group, the state's agents deviated from this policy of 
individualized treatment. Due to the potential harm that neces-
sarily adheres to children thus packaged, 123 this deviation was 
117. MICH. Juv. CT. R. 4.2(b)(6). 
The court in House of Judah adjourned the first preliminary hearing, which only in-
volved the dead boy's siblings, to investigate the rest of the camp. After a quick investi-
gation of only one day, the hearing resumed two days later, and then the court took 
temporary custody of all 66 children. Thus, although the court adjourned the first pre-
liminary hearing to investigate the camp, the investigation was insufficient to produce 
individualized information or petitions. 
118. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.1 (1979)("/E]ach child coming within the 
jurisdiction of the court shall receive ... in his home .... ")(emphasis added); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985) ("Whose home or environment, by 
reason of neglect, cruelty ... is an unfit place for such child to live in.") (emphasis 
added). See also supra note 110 which lists provisions of the statute and rules addressed 
to the individual parent, guardian, or custodian. 
119. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
120. See supra note 42. 
121. See supra note 46. 
122. See supra note 47. 
123. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
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Ill. ANALYSIS OF DEPARTURES FROM MICHIGAN LAW IN 
REMOVAL OF CHILDREN FROM House of Judah 
All of the probate court's departures from Michigan law con-
cerning the separation of a child from his parents resulted from 
the decision to treat the members of the camp as if they were 
one family. This approach is understandable, considering the 
communal nature of the group and the limited resources of the 
court and state agencies.124 In retrospect, however, not all of 
these departures comported with the legal requirements of the 
statutory policy. The isolation and structure of the camp, to-
gether with evidence of some abuse, justified allowing the show-
ing of one child's death to serve as reasonable cause to believe 
that other children in the camp might also be in danger. Beyond 
this emergency stage of removal, however, treating the parties as 
one family was contrary to the language and intent of the Juve-
nile Code and Juvenile Court Rules, and unwise as a matter of 
policy. 
A. Emergency Removal: Discretion To Err On The Side Of 
Child Protection 
Permitting the showing of one child's death to serve as reason-
able cause to believe that other children in the camp also were 
in danger was an appropriate, if not necessary, accommodation 
to the peculiar circumstances of a cult community. The isolation 
and structure of the commune were both factors relevant to the 
children's safety and welfare, and they combined to permit a 
reasonable cause showing to rest on evidence of harm to a non-
family member child.1211 Although the prosecutor was justified in 
stretching the reasonable cause requirement to include persons 
124. It is easy to sympathize with the state agencies and the Allegan community as a 
whole. Most communities, especially small, predominately white rural towns such as Al-
legan, would be shocked by these events and understandably would want to dispose of 
the problem as quickly as possible. Furthermore, in light of the unusual beliefs of the 
House of Judah, the tendency to treat its members as a group outside of the community 
is natural. Nevertheless, statutes and procedures govern child abuse and neglect, and 
this Note argues that these statutes and procedures can work effectively even in the 
unusual context of a commune or cult. 
125. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text. 
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outside of the abused child's household, not all cases involving 
cults and communes would necessarily justify this extension.126 
Membership in a cult or commune cannot itself provide justifi-
cation for intervention and removal of children from their par-
ents.127 Before removal, the state's agents must examine the rel-
ative isolation and structure of the organization. They must then 
determine whether in the given case these factors make the dan-
ger of abuse substantially greater than in an ostensibly ordinary 
case. This test allows for special scrutiny of cult and commune 
cases in contravention of the parental interests the usual proce-
dures protect. The test is justified by a policy that allows for 
error in the direction of protecting the physical safety of the 
child at the emergency phase. 
1. Isolation- Isolation of families should influence the 
court's decision regarding whether to allow the Department to 
demonstrate reasonable cause for jurisdiction with evidence of 
harm to children outside of the child's household. Michigan law 
compels courts to protect children from abuse and neglect, and 
to do this, courts must have access to information about where 
and when abuse occurs. The legislature has attempted to meet 
this need by requiring certain professionals to report suspected 
child abuse and neglect. 128 Thus, the legislative child protection 
scheme depends, at least in part, upon the adequacy of opportu-
nity to report these cases. 
The isolation of the House of Judah interfered with Michi-
gan's child protection scheme. The children in the camp neither 
attended school outside of the camp, nor visited doctors on a 
regular basis. In fact, the children were rarely seen outside of the 
camp. 129 Furthermore, the camp itself was located in a remote 
area that was not integrated with any other community.130 By 
keeping the children from public scrutiny, this isolation inter-
fered with the state's child protection scheme. 
126. See supra note 99. 
127. The Juvenile Code requires a showing of neglect as to a particular child. A show-
ing of neglect on the basis of membership in a cult or commune would presumably pre-
sent first amendment freedom of association and religion problems. 
128. Mica. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 1985). This statute requires vari-
ous professionals to report suspected abuse: 
A physician, coroner, dentist, medical examiner, nurse, audiologist, certified so-
cial worker, social worker, social work technician, school administrator, school 
counselor or teacher, law enforcement officer, or duly regulated child care pro-
vider who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect immediately 
. . . shall make an oral report . . . of the suspected child abuse or neglect to the 
(D]epartment. 
129. Atkins interview, supra note 82. See Detroit Free Press, July 10, 1983, at All. 
130. Atkins interview, supra note 82. 
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The court must respond to such circumstances in a way that 
enables it to perform its function of protecting children. One re-
sponse might be to increase public scrutiny by requiring chil-
dren to visit doctors and attend public schools. But without the 
jurisdiction conferred by a prior finding of abuse or neglect, 
these actions would be too intrusive and probably unlawful.131 
Any relaxation of the standards for jurisdiction would have to be 
done by the legislature. 
Another response to the isolation problem is to allow the 
state's agents to stretch the reasonable cause requirement to in-
clude persons outside of the abused child's household, as was 
done in House of Judah. This provides the court with an oppor-
tunity to scrutinize a more limited class of families who other-
wise, because of their isolation, would be inscrutable, and yet 
regarding whom the type of suspicion contemplated by the re-
porting statute exists.132 The protective discretion already au-
thorized at the emergency stage makes relying on harm to non-
family cult children a reasonable and acceptable way of respond-
ing to the problem of isolation. 
2. Structure- Another important factor in a court's decision 
to stretch the reasonable cause requirement is the structure of 
the commune or cult. As part of its child protection scheme, the 
legislature has empowered the state's agents to remove a child 
from his home and take temporary custody when there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the child is abused or neglected.133 
In support of this policy, a court will permit a reasonable cause 
showing as to one child to support the removal from the same 
household of that child's siblings.134 Thus, in enforcing the child 
protection scheme, courts have considered family structure a sig-
nificant factor in determining whether there is reasonable cause 
to believe that a child is in danger. 
The House of Judah camp appeared to have the structure of 
one family, and there was reasonable cause to believe that one 
child died as a result of abuse at the camp. Based upon the evi-
dence available at the time of emergency removal, it appeared 
131. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1971)(limiting state interference with 
parental rights prior to a finding of parental unfitness); Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 400-03 (1922)(invalidating a state law prohibiting the teaching of German to school 
children as being too great an infringement upon parents' right to control the education 
of their children). 
132. The Juvenile Code requires various professionals to report when they have "rea-
sonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(1) 
(West Supp. 1985). 
133. See D. DUQUETl'E, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
134. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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that authority and discipline within the camp were delegated 
and administered as if the camp were one family. 1311 Prophet 
Lewis professed to have control and authority, and considered 
the group his family. 136 The presence of a family-like structure 
legitimated the concern that the children in the camp might 
have been endangered in the same way that the siblings of an 
abused child are endangered in a single household. Yet, in the 
forty-eight hours preceding the preliminary hearing, the state's 
agents could not have conducted a sufficient investigation to de-
termine whether apparent similarities of cult to family actually 
presented sibling-like dangers to the other children. Thus, to 
provide the necessary protection to the children in the camp, the 
court was justified in allowing a .showing of reasonable cause by 
reference to children outside of each child's household.137 
B. Preliminary Hearing and Beyond: The Requirements of 
Individualized Treatment 
Beyond the initial stages of investigation and emergency re-
moval, treating the members of the commune as one family con-
flicted with the statutory policy. The Juvenile Code requires in-
creased protection of the parents' interests in care and custody, 
and the child's corresponding interest in emotional well-being, 
once emergency removal has eliminated any immediate danger. 
Because these interests focus attention on the adequacy of par-
ticular parent-child relationships, the court must scrutinize indi-
vidual parents and children to determine whether a child's home 
provides him with the minimally adequate nurturance and pro-
tection the Juvenile Code requires. It follows that the court in 
the House of Judah should have required from the state's agents 
allegations and proof based on investigation of each parent-child 
relationship. 
1. Petitions- The petitions filed in House of Judah failed 
135. See In re Children of the House of Judah, File Nos. 2206-83 to 2210-83 (Prelimi-
nary Hearing, Allegan County P. & Juv. Ct., Mich., filed July 6, 1983). The court stated: 
"[P]reliminary evidence would indicate [that] you certainly have much more [control 
and authority] probably than the ordinary father in the family." Id. at 49. 
136. See id. at 49. "The Court: '[This] particular group of people make up what it 
appears you consider as your total family.' Mr. Lewis: 'Yes, sir, right.'" 
137. The statutory policy allowing for error on the side of overprotection at the emer-
gency stage justifies reliance on mere appearance of family-like structure at this stage. 
Later in the proceedings, after the 48 hour deadline for the preliminary hearing has been 
met, the Juvenile Code requires more than mere appearance of a family-like structure. 
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to set forth facts and allegations specific to the named parties.138 
Nevertheless, the court authorized them. Although some courts 
might initially require more specific allegations, 139 the court's ac-
tion in House of Judah would have been acceptable if the court 
had required the prosecutor to amend immediately the petitions 
to address more specifically the needs of, and dangers to, indi-
vidual children. 
In House of Judah the state's agents were faced with the 
enormous task of investigating sixty-six children and their par-
ents in forty-eight hours. The Juvenile Code and Court Rules 
are not designed to require the Department to deal with this 
many children at one time. To relieve this tension created by an 
unrealistic standard, the court allowed the Department to file 
generalized petitions. This is justified under the same theory 
that justified the emergency removal of all sixty-six children. A 
petition, in one respect, merely announces the reasons for re-
moval, or for the proposed removal, of a child from his home. 140 
A petition, however, also defines the boundaries and scope of 
the case. In House of Judah the Department never individual-
ized the petitions, but instead, always treated the families as one 
group. 141 This group approach created problems in later stages 
of the case. 142 
2. Prophet Lewis as "guardian" and the cult members as 
one "family"- The court apparently used the term "guardian" 
to create and describe a position or relationship other than that 
contemplated by the Juvenile Code and Court Rules.143 By 
grouping the families together as one family and appointing 
Prophet Lewis as guardian of all of the children, the court cre-
ated a position and relationship that is not only unauthorized 
by, but is also inconsistent with, the statutory policy of individu-
alized treatment. This policy protects the child's interest in 
emotional well-being and guards against improvident return of a 
child to an unsafe home. These interests are so important to 
Michigan's child protection scheme that potentially harmful de-
viations from the policy protecting them are unacceptable. Fur-
thermore, this policy recognizes and protects the parents' rights 
to care and custody of their children. 
138. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra note 99. 
140. See supra note 14. 
141. Atkins interview, supra note 82. Moreover, according to Atkins the state 
planned to argue the cases at the adjudicatory hearing as one case. 
142. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
143. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
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The court's action may have even proved counterproductive 
by confusing the law's message to parents regarding their rights 
and responsibilities under the law. The law gives parents the 
right to, and holds them responsible for, raising and protecting 
their children. If they abuse this right or fail in this duty, the 
state ultimately may take custody of their children.144 Naming 
Prophet Lewis guardian of the children and continuing to treat 
the camp as one family was inconsistent with this principle, be-
cause it may have suggested to the parents that Lewis was re-
sponsible for raising and protecting their children. This message 
must have at the least confused, and perhaps misinstructed, the 
very parents whom the legislature wanted to encourage to be 
protective. Thus, ironically, by encouraging the parents to defer 
even more to Prophet Lewis, the court's failure to require indi-
vidualized treatment might have resulted in increased danger to 
individual children. 
3. Continued non-specific treatment: the failure to amend 
petitions- Under Michigan law, before a court can approve the 
state's temporary custody of a child, it must require the state's 
agents to investigate the alleged case of abuse or neglect,1411 file a 
petition at a preliminary hearing, 146 and at that hearing show 
that there is reasonable cause to believe the allegations in the 
petition are true and that if proven would constitute neglect. 147 
In House of Judah the court departed from these require-
ments. 148 At the emergency stage of the case these deviations 
were justified. The primary policy of the Juvenile Code requires 
protection of even possibly physically abused children, and the 
time constraints placed on the Department did not allow for in-
vestigation sufficient to determine if danger existed to all sixty-
six children. After the emergency stage, however, the time con-
straint is not a justification for any continued deviation from the 
requirement of individualized treatment. 
To fulfill Michigan's statutory policy the court in House of 
Judah should have taken three steps to remedy the procedural 
inadequacies. First, it should have required the Department to 
further investigate each child. Second, it should have required 
the Department to amend the initial petitions149 based on the 
144. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19a (West Supp. 1985). 
145. See supra note 113. 
146. See supra note 14. 
147. See D. DuQUETIE, supra note 10, at 110-11. 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17. 
149. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 712A.11 (1979) authorizes amendment of petitions in cases 
involving juveniles before the probate court. 
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individual investigations. Third, the court should have con-
ducted a second or continued preliminary hearing to weigh the 
amended petitions and new evidence. 
The proposed remedy would have been consistent with the 
statutory policy of allowing the Department authority to protect 
even possibly endangered children in the emergency phase, 150 
but requiring a more carefully individualized approach in the 
later phases of the case.m Like the Juvenile Code, this remedy 
gives primary importance to protection of physical safety, but 
provides for examination of parents under the constraints of due 
process requirements shortly thereafter. And unlike the court's 
approach in House of Judah, it provides adequate protection to 
children who otherwise may face the risk of harm due to an im-
provident return to an unsafe home. Finally, this remedy is ap-
pealing on equitable grounds. It seems unfair to the parents to 
allow the prosecutor to permanently benefit from the unusual 
circumstances of communal living by not having to show later 
that actions taken with this extraordinary authority to remove 
were justified. 
4. Negotiating return of the children as a group- The 
state's agents deviated from Michigan law and the principles of 
due process when they negotiated with the parents as a group 
for the return of their children. But even if the law does not 
specifically prohibit group negotiations, such an approach is in-
consistent with the statutory policy of individualized treatment. 
The failure to negotiate the return of the children on an indi-
vidual basis was potentially harmful to the children's interests in 
both physical safety and emotional well-being. When the return 
of children is negotiated on a group basis it is probable, espe-
cially when the situation involves numerous families, that some 
of the households will be more unsafe than others. These house-
holds might have been deemed unsafe if judged on an individual 
basis. In its attempt to reach an agreement with the various 
families in the group, the Department might tolerate some defi-
ciencies to which it normally would object. This lowering of 
standards could result in a child being returned to an unsafe 
home, contrary to the statutory policy that has as its highest 
priority the physical protection of the child. 152 
Additionally, group negotiation could interfere with some chil-
dren's interests in emotional well-being by separating them from 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
152. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
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a safe home. Just as some households are more unsafe than 
others, some households might be safer than others. There cer-
tainly will be some households in which, despite the influence of 
a figure like Prophet Lewis, individual parents will be ade-
quately protective of their children. Although a child could be 
returned safely to such a home, he might not be because other 
households affected by the group agreement are too unsafe to 
allow return of children. Thus, a child may be separated from 
the custody and care of his parents for a longer period of time 
than is necessary to ensure his safety. This result would conflict 
with the statutory policy that also protects the child's interest in 
emotional well-being. 1113 In sum, treating possibly abused chil-
dren as a package rather than as individuals departs from the 
language and policy of the child protection statute, as well as 
from constitutional due process requirements. Although such an 
approach is justified in the face of the possible danger of imme-
diate and unobservable physical harm, it loses its legitimacy 
once removal has eliminated that danger. 
IV. PROPOSALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTORY POLICY OF 
INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT 
In the "ordinary" abuse and neglect case the Michigan Juve-
nile Code operates satisfactorily. The policy of individualized 
treatment sufficiently protects the child's interests in physical 
safety and emotional well-being and the parents' interest in care 
and custody of their child. Child abuse and neglect cases involv-
ing cults and communes, however, present special problems, and 
therefore, some departures from the statute are necessary. 
Drawing on the experiences of the participants in House of Ju-
dah, this Note proposes a set of procedures that seek to provide 
adequate protection for children living in cults and communes, 
without injuring unnecessarily the interests of both the parent 
and child in a continuing, stable relationship. 
A. Allowing Special Scrutiny and Emergency Removal of 
Children Living in Isolated Family-like Organizations 
The isolation and structure of an organization can affect the 
safety and welfare of a child, and therefore the child protection 
153. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
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scheme requires evaluation of these important factors. A case in-
volving a commune or cult, such as House of Judah, provides an 
example of a situation in which the isolation and structure of 
the organization increase the danger of abuse. The isolation and 
structure of an organization should influence a court's decision 
regarding whether to allow the state's agents to show reasonable 
cause for removal of one child based on evidence of harm to chil-
dren outside that child's household. The policy allowing for er-
ror in the direction of protecting the physical safety of the child 
at the emergency stage justifies special scrutiny of cases such as 
House of Judah. 
The legislative child protection scheme relies, at least in part, 
upon an adequate opportunity for people to report cases of sus-
pected child abuse. 1114 When children become isolated from pub-
lic scrutiny, as they did in House of Judah, the court must re-
spond in a way that enables it to perform its function of 
protecting children. The response taken in House of Judah, and 
the one proposed here, is to allow the state's agents to stretch 
the reasonable cause requirement to include persons outside the 
abused child's household. This enables the court to scrutinize a 
limited class of families who otherwise, because of their isola-
tion, would remain inscrutable. The protective discretion al-
ready authorized at the emergency stage makes relying on harm 
to non-family member children living in the organization a rea-
sonable and acceptable way of responding to the problem of 
isolation. 
The degree to which an organization is structured like a fam-
ily also should affect the court's decision to extend the reach of 
the reasonable cause requirement. One child in danger in a 
household will support the removal of that child's siblings from 
the household. uui An organization with a familial structure may 
present the same sibling-like dangers. 1118 At the emergency stage, 
if the state's agents cannot conduct a sufficient investigation, the 
appearance of a family-like structure will support removal. 
Again, the discretion authorized at the emergency stage legiti-
mates the court's reliance on evidence of harm to non-family 
children living in the family-like organization to respond to the 
sibling-like dangers created by an organization with a familial 
structure. 
154. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 1985). 
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text. 
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B. Requiring Amended Petitions And A Second or 
Continued Preliminary Hearing 
1117 
To relieve the pressure created when the state's agents had to 
investigate sixty-six children in forty-eight hours, the court in 
House of Judah accepted petitions that lacked specificity. This 
was an acceptable initial accommodation because it was consis-
tent with the policy of allowing emergency removal of possibly 
endangered children, but it created problems because it set the 
boundaries for future proceedings1G7 and legitimated the Depart-
ment's group approach. 
To resolve this tension and guide the state's agents in the 
transition from emergency use of their authority to remove, to 
deference to the other relevant interests, the court should re-
quire the Department to amend petitions soon after the prelimi-
nary hearing. Then, at a second or continued preliminary hear-
ing the petitions must meet the requirements of specificity 
compelled by the statutory policy of individualized treatment. 
Requiring the Department to amend its petitions and undertake 
a second preliminary hearing would alleviate the problems cre-
ated by an unrealistic time constraint because it would allow ini-
tial removal on the basis of a general petition. At the same time, 
however, it would encourage the Department to abandon its 
group approach and attend to the needs of individual children 
as early as possible, by forcing them to justify their earlier ac-
tions in court. Thus, the cases would be brought back within the 
standards of individualized treatment that the Juvenile Code 
and Juvenile Court Rules contemplate. 
C. Negotiating With Each Family Separately 
Consistent with treating each child separately, the state must 
treat each family separately. Permitting negotiation with the 
parents as a group for the return of the children infringes upon 
the rights and interests of both the parents and children. 168 No 
reason exists to assume identity with regard to the strengths, 
weaknesses, abilities, or needs of all families in a commune or 
cult. 
Even in the unlikely event that all of the families in a com-
157. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23. 
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mune or cult are substantially similar, the state still retains an 
interest in requiring the court and Department to deal with each 
family separately. The law holds parents accountable for the 
health, safety, and welfare of their children, and treats children, 
parents, and families on an individual basis. The court and 
state's agents should make this approach and attitude clear to 
all parents, including those living in communes and cults. Thus, 
when negotiating with parents living in a commune or cult the 
state's agents should deal with them separately and explain to 
them their responsibility of securing and protecting the health, 
safety, and welfare of their child. Negotiating with the parents 
as a group confuses the law's message by giving parents the im-
pression that the group or its leader has responsibility for their 
children. 
CONCLUSION 
As part of its child protection scheme, Michigan has enacted 
the Juvenile Code. Based on a policy of individual treatment of 
children and parents, this statute protects both the child's inter-
est in physical safety and emotional well-being and the parents' 
interests in custody and care of their children. The law achieves 
its goal of protecting both interests by granting broad emergency 
authority to the state's agents, but requiring shortly after the 
emergency that the state's agents follow procedures designed to 
limit continuing intervention to cases of necessity. The child's 
physical safety is always paramount. After the immediate danger 
is gone, however, the Juvenile Code requires that such necessity 
be determined by reference to the adequacy of nurturance and 
protection in individual parent-child relationships. 
Child abuse and neglect cases that involve communes and 
cults, such as House of Judah, however, present special 
problems, and departures from the Juvenile Code may be neces-
sary. This Note has proposed procedures for adapting the state's 
child protection scheme to these unusual circumstances. The 
proposed procedures allow special scrutiny and emergency re-
moval of children living in isolated family-like organizations, re-
quire amended petitions and a second or continued preliminary 
hearing soon after the emergency removal, and require separate 
negotiations with each family regarding return of children. 
These procedures do not unnecessarily injure the interests the 
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Juvenile Code protects, and thus, are consistent with the state's 
child protection scheme. 
-Gregory M. Gochanour 

